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In its decision of February 27, 2019 in Jam v International Finance 
Corporation, the US Supreme Court ruled on the highly debated issue of 
immunity of international organizations. This case originated from a 
claim for damages brought by local farmers and fishermen and a small 
village of Gujarat, India, against International Finance Corporation 
(IFC). IFC, whose mission consists of financing private-sector develop-
ment projects in developing countries, entered into a loan agreement with 
Coastal Gujarat Power Limited, a company based in India, to finance the 
construction of a coal-fired power plant in Gujarat. The petitioners 
claimed that pollution from the plant harmed the surrounding air, land, 
and water, and claimed IFC’s liability for not having adequately super-
vised the environmental and social action plan for the project. The de-
fendant invoked its absolute immunity from jurisdiction in accordance 
with the 1945 US International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA).   
IOIA provides that organizations are afforded the ‘same immunity 
from suit […] as is enjoyed by foreign States’. However, the US law of 
foreign State immunity evolved since 1945, when IOIA was enacted. While 
at that time foreign governments were granted absolute immunity from le-
gal process in the US, since 1952 their immunity was restricted to suits 
concerning sovereign acts, as opposed to acts of a private or commercial 
character, a solution which culminated in the codification of the ‘commercial 
activities exception’ by the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).   
In Jam v IFC, the main question was whether the IOIA should be 
interpreted in a ‘static’ way, ie by referring to the law existing in 1945, at 
the time when the IOIA was enacted, or in an ‘evolving’ way, ie by refer-
ring to the law in force at the time of the suit. While the former interpre-
tation would have accorded IFC absolute immunity, the latter would 
have limited this immunity to ‘sovereign’ acts.  
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The Supreme Court, by seven votes to one, followed the latter inter-
pretation and reversed the Circuit Court’s decision that had followed the 
opposite solution. The Supreme Court held that: ‘IOIA’s reference to the 
immunity enjoyed by foreign governments is a general rather than spe-
cific reference […] [t]he reference is to an external body of potentially 
evolving law – the law of foreign sovereign immunity – not to a specific 
provision of another statute. The IOIA should therefore be understood 
to link the law of international organization immunity to the law of for-
eign sovereign immunity, so that the one develops in tandem with the 
other.’ In addition, the Court noted that: ‘the IFC’s own charter does not 
state that the IFC is absolutely immune from suit’.  Consequently, the 
Supreme Court remanded the case to the District Court for the District 
of Columbia for further proceedings.  
On February 14, 2020, the District Court granted IFC’s motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It held that ‘plaintiffs’ law-
suit does not fall within the FSIA’s commercial activity exception because 
the suit is not, at its core, based upon activity – commercial or otherwise 
– carried on or performed in the United States’.   
Although the Supreme Court’s decision is essentially focused on the 
interpretation of US statutory law, it offers significant points for reflec-
tion on the nature and scope of IO immunities under international law. 
Five broad key-issues are worth examining. 
A first critical issue is whether IOs enjoy immunities under interna-
tional customary law.  This question, which is still waiting for investiga-
tion at the ILC, is not purely theoretical: although immunities from civil 
jurisdiction are often provided in international agreements (either consti-
tutive instruments of IOs, or multilateral and bilateral conventions), they 
are frequently invoked before courts of States that are not bound by these 
conventional rules. Moreover, some constitutive treaties (as in the pre-
sent case) do not grant IOs with absolute immunity from private suits. 
A second important issue regards the relationship between different 
sources regulating IO immunities (customary international law, treaty law 
and domestic law). To what extent can the silence of a treaty be integrated 
by any existent rule of customary international law or domestic law on IO 
immunities? Can the interpretation of a domestic statute on IO immunities 
supersede the applicable rules of international law governing this issue? 
And what impact, if any, does the interpretation of a domestic statutory 
norm have on the development of the international law of IO immunities? 
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A third and related point is the use of analogy for the purpose of as-
sessing the content of IO immunities. While State immunities are based 
on the principle of sovereign equality, the rationale of IO immunities is 
most frequently identified in the doctrine of functional necessity. If the 
above is correct, to what extent can the rules on States immunities be 
applied also to determine the scope of IO immunities?  
Fourthly, even if one considers it possible to apply the ‘commercial 
activities exception’ to IOs, the practical application of this standard still 
needs clarification. The Supreme Court judges themselves acknowledged 
that ‘it is not clear that the lending activity of all development banks qual-
ifies as commercial activity within the meaning of the [FSIA exception]’. 
As noted by J. Breyer in his dissenting opinion, ‘[u]nlike foreign govern-
ments, international organizations are not sovereign entities engaged in a 
host of different activities’. Such difference between States and IOs could 
make it difficult to identify the precise boundaries of the IO’s immunities 
based on the distinction between sovereign and commercial acts, espe-
cially when the main function of the relevant IO necessarily implies en-
tering into private transactions.  
A last point, which did not specifically arise in Jam v IFC, concerns 
the relationship between IO immunities and human rights law. To which 
extent are IO immunities conditional upon the existence of alternative 
remedies available to the victims of human rights violations? 
QIL asked two authors to discuss the Supreme Court decision in Jam 
v IFC in light of the above-mentioned issues. Fernando Lusa Bordin ex-
plores the foundations and scope of IO immunity under general interna-
tional law, arguing a potential analogy between State immunity and IO 
immunity. Yohei Okada addresses the impact of the ‘tandem’ approach 
between State and IO immunity adopted by the Supreme Court on the 
relevance of the functional necessity doctrine in the interpretation and 
application of the IOIA. 
 
 
